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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a finite set of agents with commonly known full-support priors on the
fundamental space of uncertainty. Then, we show that if the hierarchies of conditional beliefs
a´ la Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999) are derived from these priors, then each agent’s hierarchy
is commonly known, and consequently all types of the same agent yield the same hierarchy.
We also show that the previous result does not necessarily hold when the priors are not full-
support. Moreover, if the collections of conditioning events does not cover the underlying space
of uncertainty, there are always commonly known (non-full-support) priors such that every
agent’s conditional belief hierarchies are derived from these priors.
Keywords: Epistemic game theory, hierarchies of conditional beliefs, prior beliefs, common
knowledge.
JEL Classification: C70, D80, D81, D82.
1. Introduction
Hierarchies of conditional beliefs are an integral tool of modern economic theory. They were first
introduced by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999), and were proven extremely useful for the epistemic
analysis of solution concepts in extensive form games, e.g., Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) pro-
vide an epistemic characterization of extensive form rationalizable outcomes, whereas Battigalli and
Friedenberg (2010) epistemically characterize extensive form best response sets.
∗Financial support from the Marie Curie Fellowship (PIEF-GA-2009-237614) is gratefully acknowledged.
†P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands; Tel: +31-43-38 83649; Fax: +31-43-38 84878; E-mail:
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Conditional beliefs generalize usual probabilistic beliefs, in that every agent is endowed with a
collection of conditioning events1, and forms conditional beliefs given each hypothesis, in a way that
Bayesian updating is satisfied whenever possible. Such a collection of measures is called conditional
probability system2 (Reˆnyi, 1955). An agent’s first order conditional beliefs are described by a con-
ditional probability system over the fundamental space of uncertainty3; the second order conditional
beliefs are described by a conditional probability system over the space of the opponents’ first order
conditional beliefs; and so on. Obviously, conditional belief hierarchies are very complex objects,
thus making it quite hard to work with them. In an attempt to make them more tractable, Battigalli
and Siniscalchi (1999) represent them with a compact (type-based) model which mimics Harsanyi’s
representation of usual belief hierarchies. Namely, for each agent there is a set of types. Each type
is associated with a conditional probability system over the product of the fundamental space of
uncertainty and the set of the opponents’ types. This construction induces a hierarchy of conditional
beliefs for each type.
We say that an agent’s conditional beliefs are derived from some prior, q, over the fundamental
space of uncertainty, whenever the first order conditional beliefs given any non-q-null conditioning
event are derived by applying Bayes law on q. The prior captures the beliefs that the agent has about
the fundamental space of uncertainty before having received any additional information in the form
of some conditioning event (Aumann, 1998). That is, a probabilistic assessment about the natural
world, which is represented by the fundamental space of uncertainty, is the product of two sources
of information, the one embodied in the prior, and the one contained in the conditioning event.
Quite often, it is suggested that differences in probabilistic beliefs should be necessarily attributed
to different conditioning events. That is, the prior beliefs of an agent are commonly known, i.e.,
everybody knows that the agent derives her beliefs from this prior, everybody knows that everybody
knows this, and so on. In principle, we are neither in favor, nor against this view. Our aim is to
examine how restrictive this condition really is.
The main result of the paper (Theorem 1) shows that if it is common knowledge that every
agent’s beliefs are derived from some full-support prior – not necessarily common for all agents –
then every type of this agent has the same hierarchy of conditional beliefs. This result, though
rather simple to prove, is a bit surprising, as it completely rules out information asymmetries. The
intuition is as follows: Recall that, whenever the priors are commonly known, differences in beliefs
1In an extensive form game, a player’s collection of conditioning events, else called conditioning hypotheses, would
typically correspond to the information sets controlled by the player.
2For the formal definition, see Section 3.
3In epistemic game theory, we usually take the strategy space as the fundamental space of uncertainty, whereas in
incomplete information games the latter coincides with the set of possible payoff functions.
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should be attributed to different conditioning events. However, Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999)
construct the type space in a way such that all types of the same agent share the same conditioning
hypotheses. Therefore, two types can in principle differ only in the conditional beliefs given zero-
probability conditioning events. However, the latter is not possible if the (commonly known prior)
is full-support, as in this case no conditioning hypothesis is a null event. In fact, we illustrate (in
Example 1) that the previous result is tight with respect to the full-support assumption. Moreover,
we show (Theorem 2) that for an arbitrary type space, if the collection of conditioning hypotheses
does not cover the fundamental space of uncertainty, there are always non-full-support priors such
that every it is commonly known that the beliefs are derived from these priors. The intuition here is
that these priors are concentrated on the states that are not contained in any conditioning hypothesis,
implying that all conditioning events are null-events, and therefore are not restricted by the priors.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains some mathematical preliminaries; Section 3
presents the type-based representation of conditional belief hierarchies; Section 4 contains our results.
2. Preliminaries
We present some preliminaries on Polish spaces. For further reference see Kechris (1995). A topolog-
ical space (Z, T ) is called Polish if it is separable and completely metrizable. The countable product
of Polish spaces, endowed with the product topology, is Polish. A closed subspace of a Polish space,
endowed with the relative topology, is also Polish.
For any topological space Z, let ∆(Z) denote the set of all Borel probability measures, endowed
with the topology of weak convergence. If Z is Polish then so is ∆(Z). For some p ∈ ∆(Z), let Γ(p)
denote its support, i.e., the set of all points z ∈ Z such that every T ∈ T with z ∈ T has positive
probability: Γ(p) = {z ∈ Z : z ∈ T ∈ T ⇒ p(T ) > 0}. The support is the smallest closed subset of
Z with measure equal to 1. If Z is separable and metrizable, the support is unique (Parthasarathy,
1967, pp. 27–28).
3. Hierarchies of conditional beliefs
Let (Σ,A) be a measurable space, where Σ is Polish, A is the Borel σ-algebra, and let B ⊆ A \ {∅}
be a collection of non-empty clopen4 conditioning events (not necessarily an algebra). Throughout
the paper we assume that B is a countable collection of subsets.
4The assumption about the elements of B being both closed and open is rather standard. For further discussion,
see Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999, p. 191).
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Definition 1. A conditional probability system (CPS) on (Σ,A,B) is a function pi : A× B → [0, 1]
that satisfies the following properties:
(C1) pi(B|B) = 1, if B ∈ B,
(C2) pi(·|B) is a probability measure over (Σ,A) for every B ∈ B,
(C3) pi(A|C) = pi(A|B)× pi(B|C), if A ⊆ B ⊆ C, and A ∈ A and B,C ∈ B.
The underlying idea behind this construction is as follows: There is a fundamental space of uncer-
tainty, Σ, which can be thought as a collection of all possible values that some objective parameters
may take, e.g., the set of possible payoff functions in an incomplete information game, or the set of
action profiles in a game. The collection B contains all the conditioning events5 that an agent could
possibly observe. Every conditioning event, B ∈ B, yields a probability distribution, pi(·|B), over
the measurable space (Σ,A), which corresponds to the conditional beliefs given B. Throughout the
paper, for notation simplicity, we often skip A and we simply write (Σ,B). Conditional probability
systems are due to Reˆnyi (1955), and were first introduced in a game-theoretic framework by Myerson
(1986).
Let ∆B(Σ) denote the space of CPS’s over (Σ,B). Observe that ∆B(Σ) is a subspace of [∆(Σ)]B,
which is a Polish space, endowed with the product topology6 (of weak convergence of measures).
Then, it follows from ∆B(Σ) being a closed subset of [∆(Σ)]B, that it is also a Polish space endowed
with the relative topology (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 1999, Lemma 1).
Let I = {a, b} be the set of individuals7, with typical elements i and j. Agent i is endowed with
a collection of conditioning hypotheses, Bi. Agent i’s first order beliefs consist of a CPS over Σ, thus
inducing a collection of probability measures – one for every conditioning hypothesis. The second
order beliefs consist of a CPS over Σ×∆Bj(Σ), thus inducing a collection of measures – one for each
conditioning hypothesis – over the opponent’s first order beliefs.
5In an extensive form game, B often corresponds to the collection of information sets.
6As usual, the space of probability measures, ∆(Σ), is endowed with the topology of weak convergence. Since Σ
is Polish, so is ∆(Σ) (Aliprantis and Border, 1994, p. 515). Then, the product space [∆(Σ)]B is also a Polish space,
endowed with the product topology (Kechris, 1995, p.).
7Our analysis can be directly generalized to any finite set of individuals. Throughout the paper, we stick to two
individuals for notation simplicity.
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Formally, consider the following sequence:
Θ0i := Σ B0i := Bi
Θ1i := Θ
0
i ×∆B
0
j (Θ0j) B1i := {B0i ×∆B
0
j (Θ0j) ⊆ Θ1i | B0i ∈ B0i }
...
...
Θn+1i := Θ
n
i ×∆B
n
j (Θnj ) Bn+1i := {Bni ×∆B
n
j (Θnj ) ⊆ Θn+1i | Bni ∈ Bni }
...
...
For all n ≥ 0, the CPS pin+1i ∈ ∆Bni (Θni ) denotes agent i’s (n + 1)-th order conditional beliefs, and
pii := (pi
1
i , pi
2
i , ...) ∈ ×∞n=0∆Bni (Θni ) is i’s hierarchy of (conditional) beliefs, with pin+1i (·|Bni ) denoting
the conditional measure given the hypothesis Bni ∈ Bni .
Observe that, by construction, every element in Bni is a clopen cylinder generated by some element
of B0i (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 1999, p. 193), and therefore i’s (n+ 1)-th order conditional beliefs
given Bni = B
0
i × ∆B
0
j (Θ0j) × · · · × ∆B
n−1
j (Θn−1j ) are essentially determined by the event B
0
i ∈ B0i .
Throughout the paper, with slight abuse of notation, we write ∆Bi(Θni ) instead of ∆
Bni (Θni ), and
pini (·|Bi) instead of pini (·|Bni ) (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 1999, p. 194).
As usual, we impose the standard coherency restriction, which, roughly speaking, says that i’s
n-th order beliefs do not contradict i’s (n− 1)-th order beliefs. Formally, some pii ∈ ×∞n=0∆Bi(Θni ) is
coherent whenever
margΘn−2 pi
n
i = pi
n−1
i ,
with margΘk−2 pi
n
i :=
(
margΘk−2 pi
n
i (·|Bi) ; Bi ∈ Bi
)
. We focus on the hierarchies that satisfy, not
only coherency, but also common certainty in coherency. That is, we restrict attention to types that
(1) are coherent, (2) assign probability 1 (given every conditioning hypothesis) to the event that
the opponent’s beliefs are coherent, and so on. We denote the set of these hierarchies by T ∗i , else
called i’s universal type space. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999) show that there is a homeomorphism
T ∗i 7→ ∆B∗i (Σ× T ∗j ), implying that every belief hierarchy in T ∗i is associated with a unique CPS over
(Σ× T ∗j ,B∗i ), where B∗i := {Bi × T ∗j | Bi ∈ Bi} denotes i’s conditioning hypotheses8 in Σ× T ∗j .
Hierarchies of conditional beliefs are very complex objects, and therefore it is quite hard working
with them. Following the standard practice first introduced by Harsanyi (1967-68) in a slightly
different framework, Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999) introduce a compact way of representing them
with a type space model.
Definition 2. A Σ-based type space model (T -space) is a tuple (Σ,Ba,Bb, Ta, Tb, ga, gb), where Σ is
Polish, Bi is a collection of non-empty clopen subsets of Σ, Ti is a Polish (type) space and gi : Ti →
8For an arbitrary Polish space Y , let ∆Bi(Σ× Y ) denote the collection of CPS’s over (Σ× Y, {Bi × Y | Bi ∈ Bi}).
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∆Bi(Σ × Tj) a continuous function, with gBii [ti] ∈ ∆(Σ × Tj) denoting the conditional probability
measure associated with ti ∈ Ti given the hypothesis Bi ∈ Bi.
A type, ti ∈ Ti, is associated with a complete description of the agent’s state of mind, thus
inducing a hierarchy of conditional beliefs. The first order conditional beliefs are given by the CPS
pi1i (·|ti) :=
(
pi1i (·|ti, Bi);Bi ∈ Bi
) ∈ ∆Bi(Θ0i ), where
pi1i (σ|ti, Bi) :=
∫
tj∈Tj
gBii [ti](σ, tj) dtj
denotes the probability density that ti assigns to an arbitrary σ ∈ Σ given the hypothesis Bi.
For every n > 0, let the correspondence βnj : ∆
Bj(Θn−1j )  Tj ∪ {∅} map every j’s n-th order
belief hierarchy to a (possibly empty) set of types in Tj. That is, for an arbitrary pi
n
j ∈ ∆Bj(Θn−1j ),
let
βnj (pi
n
j ) := {tj ∈ Tj : pinj (·|tj) = pinj }.
Then, i’s (n + 1)-th order beliefs are given by the CPS pin+1i (·|ti) :=
(
pin+1i (·|ti, Bi);Bi ∈ Bi
) ∈
∆Bi(Θni ), where
pin+1i (σ, pi
1
j , ..., pi
n
j |ti, Bi) :=
∫
tj∈β1j (pi1j )∩···∩βnj (pinj )
gBii [ti](σ, tj) dtj
denotes the probability density that ti assigns to an arbitrary (σ, pi
1
j , ..., pi
n
j ) ∈ Σ ×∆Bj(Θ0j) × · · · ×
∆Bj(Θn−1j ) given the hypothesis Bi ×∆Bj(Θ0j)× · · · ×∆Bj(Θn−1j ).
4. Conditional belief hierarchies and prior beliefs
Definition 3. We say that ti’s beliefs about Σ are derived from the prior qi ∈ ∆(Σ), whenever for
an arbitrary σ ∈ Σ,
pi1i (σ|ti, Bi) = qi(σ|Bi)
for all Bi ∈ Bi with qi(Bi) > 0.
In order to say that it is commonly known that i’s beliefs are derived from a prior qi, we first
need to formally define the notion of common knowledge, which corresponds to the intuitive idea
that everybody knows that i’s prior over Σ is qi, everybody knows that everybody knows that i’s
prior over Σ is qi, and so on. In order to do so, we construct the associated state space model of
(Σ,Ba,Bb, Ta, Tb, ga, gb). Let
Ω := Σ× Ta × Tb
be the state space associated with the T -space above, with typical element ω = (σ, ta, tb). Let
ti(ω) := margTi ω and σ(ω) := margΣ ω. Moreover, let [ti] := {ω ∈ Ω : ti(ω) = ti} and [σ] :=
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{ω ∈ Ω : σ(ω) = σ}. Endow every agent with an information partition Pi, with Pi(ω) containing
the states ω′ ∈ Ω that i cannot distinguish from ω. We define the information partition as usual
(Brandenburger and Dekel, 1993), i.e., for each ω ∈ Ω let
Pi(ω) := {ω′ ∈ Ω : ti(ω′) = ti(ω)} = [ti(ω)].
That is, i cannot distinguish between states that correspond to the same Ti-type. As usual, we say
that i knows an event E ⊆ Ω at ω, whenever Pi(ω) ⊆ E. Let the partitionM := Pa ∧Pb denote the
finest common coarsening of the information partitions, with M(ω) denoting the element ofM that
contains ω. Then, E is commonly known at ω, if and only if M(ω) ⊆ E (Aumann, 1976).
Let [qi] ⊆ Ω be the set of states where i’s beliefs about the underlying space of uncertainty are
derived from qi. Formally, we have
[qi] := {ω ∈ Ω : pi1i (·|ti(ω), Bi) = qi(·|Bi), for all Bi ∈ Bi with qi(Bi) > 0}.
Then it follows from the previous discussion that it is common knowledge at ω that i’s beliefs are
derived from qi, whenever M(ω) ⊆ [qi].
Theorem 1. Let (Σ,Ba,Bb, Ta, Tb, ga, gb) be a type space model. If it is commonly known that the
beliefs of every i ∈ {a, b} are derived from a full-support prior qi ∈ ∆(Σ), then every ti ∈ Ti yields the
same hierarchy of conditional beliefs, i.e., if for every i there is some qi ∈ ∆(Σ) such that Γ(qi) = Σ
and M(ω) ⊆ [qi], then there is some p˜ii ∈ ×∞n=0∆Bi(Θni ) such that pii(·|ti) = p˜ii for all ti ∈ Ti.
Proof. It follows by construction that M(ω) = Ω, implying that [qi] = Ω. Since qi is full-support,
it follows that qi(Bi) > 0 for all Bi ∈ Bi, and therefore pi1i (·|ti, Bi) = qi(·|Bi) for all σ ∈ Σ and all
ti ∈ Ti. Hence, there is some p˜i1i ∈ ∆Bi(Θ0i ) such that pi1i (·|ti) = p˜i1i for all ti ∈ Ti, implying that
β1i (p˜i
1
i ) = Ti for each i ∈ {a, b}. The latter implies that for all ti ∈ Ti, the second order beliefs are
such that (a) if pi1j 6= p˜i1j , then pi2i (σ, pi1j |ti, Bi) = 0 for every σ ∈ Σ, and (b) if pi1j = p˜i1j , then for an
arbitrary σ ∈ Σ,
pi2i (σ, p˜i
1
j |ti, Bi) =
∫
tj∈β1j (p˜i1j )
gBii [ti](σ, tj) dtj
=
∫
tj∈Tj
gBii [ti](σ, tj) dtj
= pi1i (σ|ti, Bi)
= qi(σ|Bi).
Thus, there is some p˜i2i ∈ ∆Bi(Θ1i ) such that pi2i (·|ti) = p˜i2i for all ti ∈ Ti. Inductively, we obtain
βni (p˜i
n
i ) = Ti for all i ∈ {a, b}, which implies that there is some p˜ini ∈ ∆Bi(Θn−1i ) such that pini (·|ti) = p˜ini
for all ti ∈ Ti, which completes the proof.
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The previous result, though rather straightforward to prove, is a bit surprising, as it essentially
states that common knowledge of i’s prior leads to common knowledge of i’s conditional belief hier-
archy. Therefore, all interactive uncertainty about Σ is finally attributed to interactive uncertainty
about the prior beliefs.
Notice that the previous result relies on qi being full-support. This assumption is quite crucial
as the following example illustrates.
Example 1. Let Σ := {σ1, σ2, σ3}, and Ba := {Σ, {σ1, σ2}} and Bb := {Σ}, and suppose that
Ta = {t1a, t2a} and Tb = {tb}. Let both types of player a assigns probability 1 to (σ3, tb) given the
conditioning event Σ ∈ Ba, i.e., gΣa [tka](σ3, tb) = 1 for k = 1, 2. On the other hand, the two types
differ in their beliefs given the hypothesis {σ1, σ2}, in that t1a assigns probability 1 to (σ1, tb), whereas
t2a assigns probability 1 to (σ2, tb), i.e., g
{σ1,σ2}
a [tka](σk, tb) = 1 for k = 1, 2. Finally, g
Σ
b [tb] is uniformly
distributed over Σ × Ta. Observe that the only prior qa ∈ ∆(Σ) such that both t1a’s and t2a’s beliefs
are derived from qa, is the one that assigns probability 1 to {σ3}. Notice that this prior meets all the
conditions stated in Theorem 1, except the full-support one. Therefore, the fact that the two types
of a yield different first order conditional beliefs is attributed to the failure to satisfy the full-support
condition, implying that the latter is rather crucial. /
In fact, if we relax the requirement about qi being full-support, all conditional belief hierarchies
can be derived from some commonly known prior, as long as the collection of conditioning events
does not cover the underlying space of uncertainty.
Theorem 2. Let (Σ,Ba,Bb, Ta, Tb, ga, gb) be a type space model, such that
⋃
Bi∈Bi Bi ( Σ. Then there
are commonly known priors qi ∈ ∆(Σ) such that the beliefs of every i ∈ {a, b} are derived from qi.
Proof. The proof is straightforward if we consider qi’s such that Γ(qi) = Σ\
(⋃
Bi∈Bi Bi
)
. The latter
is always possible as
⋃
Bi∈Bi Bi is an open set, implying that the complement Σ\
(⋃
Bi∈Bi Bi
)
is closed.
Then, obviously qi(Bi) = 0 for all Bi ∈ Bi implying that the prior does not impose any restriction
on the conditional beliefs given Bi, and therefore i’s beliefs can be derived from qi.
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